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High-interest-rate currencies tend to appreciate relative to low-interest-rate currencies. We argue that
adverse-selection problems between participants in foreign exchange markets can account for this
'forward premium puzzle.' The key feature of our model is that the adverse selection problem facing
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A classic challenge confronting macroeconomists is how to explain why low-interest-rate cur-
rencies tend to depreciate relative to high-interest-rate currencies. An alternative statement
of the challenge is that currencies which are at a forward premium tend to depreciate. This
empirical regularity, known as the ‘forward premium puzzle,’ represents an egregious devi-
ation from uncovered interest parity. While great strides have been made in documenting
the puzzle, very little progress has been made in explaining it.1 Much of the literature on
this puzzle shares two key features. First, the foreign exchange market is modeled as an
idealized Walrasian market.2 Second, the literature emphasizes risk-based explanations for
the forward premium. The ﬁrst feature is problematic because, the foreign exchange market
is actually a decentralized, over-the-counter market in which market makers play a central
role (see Lyons (2001) and Sarno and Taylor (2001). The second feature is also problematic.
While risk must surely play a role in exchange rate markets, it has been extremely diﬃcult to
tie deviations from uncovered interest parity to economically meaningful measures of risk.3
In this paper we approach the forward premium puzzle from a new angle. Speciﬁcally,
w et a k es e r i o u s l yt h en o t i o nt h a tt h ef o r e i g ne x c h a n g em a r k e ti sn o tW a l r a s i a ni nn a t u r ea n d
that risk is perhaps not at the center of the puzzle. Our analysis emphasizes adverse-selection
problems between market makers and traders. To isolate the role of adverse selection we
work with a simple model that abstracts entirely from risk considerations.
Our model is based on the microstructure approach developed in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985). We assume that spot exchange rates follow an exogenous stochastic process with em-
pirically realistic time-series properties. Our goal is to study the circumstances under which
adverse-selection considerations imply that forward premia comove negatively, in population,
with changes in exchange rates. We could, of course, make the spot exchange rate endoge-
nous. But doing so in a way that would yield an empirically plausible exchange rate process
would greatly complicate the analysis without contributing to our objective of understanding
the comovement of forward rates and spot exchange rates.4
1See Engel (1996) for a survey of the early literature. For more recent contributions see Han, Hirshleifer,
and Wang (2006), Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) and the references therein.
2Recent exceptions include Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2006).
3See Engel (1996) for a review of the literature up to the mid-1990s and Burnside (2007) for a critical
review of recent risk-based explanations of the forward premium puzzle.
4In this sense our procedure is similar in spirit to the classic analysis of Hansen and Singleton (1982) who
assume that consumption is an exogenous stochastic process and study the comovement between consumption
1T h eb a s i cs t r u c t u r eo fo u rm o d e li sa sf o l l o w s .T w ot y p e so fr i s k - n e u t r a lt r a d e r se n t e ri n t o
forward contracts with competitive, risk-neutral, market makers. Informed traders have more
information about exchange rate movements than market makers.5 Uninformed traders have
the same information as market makers. The uninformed traders follow a behavioral trading
rule: they are more likely to buy (sell) the pound forward when, based on public information,
the pound is expected to appreciate (depreciate).6 While this rule seems natural, we do not
derive it from ﬁrst principles. We assume the rule because it allows us to exposit, in a
transparent way, the adverse-selection rationale for the forward premium puzzle.7
The presence of informed agents creates an adverse-selection problem for the market
maker. When the market maker receives an order he does not know whether it comes from
an informed or an uninformed trader. However, he can quote diﬀerent prices for buy and
sell orders and make these prices depend on whether he expects the pound to appreciate or
depreciate.
Our main result is that adverse-selection considerations can account for the forward
premium puzzle. To be precise, consider an econometrician who regresses the change in
the exchange rate on the forward premium using data generated by our model. Denote
by ˆ β the econometrician’s estimate of the slope coeﬃcient, β. Conditional on a regularity
condition holding, the probability limit (plim) of ˆ β is negative. This result obtains whether
the econometrician works with the bid forward rate (the rate at which traders can sell the
p o u n df o r w a r dt ot h em a r k e tm a k e r ) ,t h ea s kf o r w a r dr a t e( t h er a t ea tw h i c ht r a d e r sc a n
buy the pound forward from the market maker), or the average of the ask and bid rates. Our
regularity condition requires that agents’ ability to forecast exchange rates based on public
information be small relative to the private information available to informed traders. This
regularity condition has an alternative interpretation: as long as it is diﬃcult to forecast
exchange rates using public information and there are informed traders that make positive
expected proﬁts then there must be a forward premium puzzle.
The key to our result is that the market maker’s adverse-selection problem is worse when,
and asset prices.
5Equivalently, these traders can be thought of as being better at processing information than market
makers. See Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2007) for a recent paper that stresses the importance of
diﬀerences in investor sophistication for explaining the patters of international equity ﬂows.
6We refer to the local currency in our model as the pound because in Section 4 we use exchange rate data
quoted in units of foreign currency per British pound.
7We conjecture that it is possible to generate this trading pattern in a model in which exporters have an
incentive to hedge exchange rate risk and where the home currency appreciates when the demand for home
exports rises.
2based on public information, the pound is expected to depreciate. To see why, it is useful to
focus on the ask forward rate. Suppose that, on the basis of public information, the pound
is expected to depreciate. Then uninformed traders are likely to sell the pound forward. It
follows that, if the market maker receives a buy order, he attaches a high probability that
the order came from an informed trader who expects the pound to appreciate. Consequently
the market maker quotes a high price for the buy order, that is, a high ask forward exchange
rate. The forward premium (evaluated at the ask rate) is, on average, high when the pound
depreciates. So the model captures the negative correlation that deﬁnes the forward premium
puzzle.
While the forward premium puzzle is a pervasive phenomenon, it is not uniformly present
in the data. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show that, in a cross section of countries, estimates
of the slope coeﬃcient β are positively related to the average rate of inﬂation. Our model is
consistent with this observation. Suppose that high-inﬂation countries experience persistent
currency depreciations, and that public information is more useful for predicting exchange
rates in these countries. When this predictability is suﬃciently high, our regularity condition
fails, and the plim of ˆ β becomes one. We provide evidence, complementary to that in Bansal
and Dahlquist (2000), which is consistent with this property of our model.
In addition to providing an explanation of the forward premium puzzle, our model ac-
counts for two other features of the data that are not obviously related to this puzzle. First,
it is well-known that the current spot exchange rate is a better forecaster of the future spot
exchange rate than the forward rate. We show that this property always holds when there
is a forward premium puzzle. Since our model accounts for the forward premium puzzle it
is consistent with this property. Second, we show that estimates of β are negatively related
to the volatility of the forward premium, both in the data and in the model.
We conclude by addressing three potential concerns about our explanation of the forward
premium puzzle. The ﬁrst concern is that we require volatility in bid-ask spreads that are
much higher than those observed in the data. In fact, our model generates forward bid-
ask spreads that are, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, constant. So, if anything our model
understates the volatility of bid-ask spreads. The second concern is that our model requires
very volatile forward premia. Given covered interest rate parity, this property would imply
that our model generates movements in interest rate spreads that are counterfactually high.
The third concern is that our model requires a large fraction of informed traders.
3We address the last two concerns in an numerical example. We show that our model can
account for the forward premium puzzle even though the volatility of the forward premium
and interest rate spreads is roughly one sixth of that in the data. So adverse selection
considerations can account for the forward premium puzzle, while adding very little volatility
to interest rates. In addition, we show that the fraction of informed traders required to
generate the forward premium puzzle is extremely small.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present our model is Section 2
and discuss its properties in Section 3. Section 4 contains a numerical example. Section 5
discusses the model’s predictions for the existence and magnitude of the forward premium
puzzle. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
In this section we display our model economy. We assume that the spot exchange rate follows
an exogenous stochastic process. Forward rates are determined by the interaction between
competitive market makers, informed, and uninformed traders. All agents are risk neutral.
2.1. Law of Motion of the Spot Exchange Rate
To simplify, we abstract from bid-ask spreads associated with spot exchange rates. The
stochastic process for the growth rate of the spot exchange rate is given by:
St+1 − St
St
= φt + εt+1 + ωt+1. (2.1)
Here St denotes the spot exchange rate expressed as foreign currency units per British pound.
The variable φt represents the change in the exchange rate that is predictable on the
basis of time t public information.8 At the beginning of time t, all traders observe φt.F o r
simplicity we assume that this variable is i.i.d. and obeys:
φt =
½
φ with probability 1/2,
−φ with probability 1/2,
where φ>0.
The variable εt+1 is not directly observed at time t,b u t ,a sw ed e s c r i b eb e l o w ,o n eg r o u p
of traders receives advance signals about its value. This variable is i.i.d. and obeys:
εt+1 =
½
ε with probability 1/2,
−ε with probability 1/2,
8One obvious source of public information is monetary policy. For example, a country that has persistently
high monetary growth rates has predictability high rates of exchange rate depreciation.
4where ε>0.
F i n a l l y ,n o n eo ft h ea g e n t si nt h em o d e lh a si n f o r m a t i o na tt i m et about the value of
ωt+1. The presence of this shock allows the model tog e n e r a t ee x c h a n g er a t ev o l a t i l i t yt h a t
is not tied to either private or public information. The variable ωt+1 is i.i.d., mean zero, and
has variance σ2
ω.T h et h r e es h o c k sφt, εt+1,a n dωt+1 are mutually orthogonal.
2.2. Traders and Market Makers
There is a continuum of traders with measure one. A fraction α of the traders are informed.
At the beginning of time t, informed traders receive a signal ζt ∈ {ε,−ε} which has the
following property:
Pr(ζt = ε|εt+1 = ε)=P r ( ζt = −ε|εt+1 = −ε)=q>1/2.
An alternative to the information-based interpretation of ζt is that all agents have the same
information set but some agents are simply better at processing information. Informed
traders buy (sell) the pound forward when their signal is ζt = ε (ζt = −ε). In the appendix,
we show that this strategy is optimal.
Af r a c t i o n1 − α of the traders are uninformed. These traders adopt the following be-
havioral trading rule. They buy pounds forward when they expect the pound to appreciate
(φt is positive). They sell pounds forward when they expect the pound to depreciate (φt is
negative). This rule, together with our assumptions about informed traders, generates the
adverse-selection problem underlying our results. We later generalize this trading rule so
that uninformed traders are more likely to buy (sell) pounds forward when, based on public
information, the pound is expected to appreciate (depreciate).
All trade takes place with market makers. There is free entry into market making, so
competition drives the expected proﬁts of market makers to zero.9 Each market maker draws
one trader per period from a continuum. The trader can submit an order of ﬁxed size x to
buy or sell pounds forward. Since agents are risk neutral they typically want to buy or sell
an inﬁnite number pounds forward. For simplicity we limit the order size to a ﬁnite number,
x. We could make the order size ﬁnite by assuming that traders are risk averse, but this
would greatly complicate the analysis.
9The probability of a trader trading more than once at time t is zero. This property rules out strategic
considerations.
52.3. The Market Maker’s Problem
T h em a r k e tm a k e rd o e sn o to b s e r v eεt+1 or whether a trader is informed. However, he does
observe φt and knows whether a trader wants to buy or sell pounds forward. At time t the
market maker posts ask and bid forward rates, Fa
t (φt) and Fb
t (φt), that depend on φt.T o
illustrate the nature of the market maker’s problem we now derive Fa
t (φ),t h ea s kf o r w a r d
rate when φt is positive and uninformed traders expect the pound to appreciate. See the
appendix for the derivations of Fb
t (φ), F a
t (−φ),a n dFb
t (−φ).






t (φ) − St+1.
Here, πm
t+1 is denominated in units of the foreign currency. Since the market maker’s expected





t (φ) − E(St+1|buy,φ)=0 .
Using equation (2.1) we have:
F
a
t (φ)=St [1 + φ + E(εt+1|buy,φ)]. (2.2)
We now use Bayes’ rule to evaluate the market maker’s expectation of εt+1 conditional on
his information set. This expectation is given by:
E(εt+1|buy,φ)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|buy,φ)(ε)+P r ( εt+1 = −ε|buy,φ)(−ε). (2.3)
Bayes’ rule implies:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|buy,φ)=
Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,φ)Pr(εt+1 = ε)
Pr(buy|φ)
. (2.4)
To compute Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,φ) we must distinguish between the actions of informed and
uninformed traders. When φt = φ uninformed traders buy the pound forward. When
εt+1 = ε, informed traders receive, with probability q, the signal ζt = ε. Given this signal
they buy the pound forward. Since there are 1 − α uninformed traders and α informed
traders, it follows that:
Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,φ)=1− α + αq. (2.5)
6This equation allows us to compute the numerator of (2.4). Turning to the denominator, we
have that:
Pr(buy|φ)=P r ( buy|εt+1 = ε,φ)Pr(εt+1 = ε)+P r ( buy|εt+1 = −ε,φ)Pr(εt+1 = −ε). (2.6)
Therefore we need to compute Pr(buy|εt+1 = −ε,φ). Uninformed traders buy the pound
forward because φt = φ.S i n c eεt+1 = −ε informed traders receive, with probability 1 − q,
the signal ζt = ε. Given this signal they buy the pound forward, so:
Pr(buy|εt+1 = −ε,φ)=1− α + α(1 − q). (2.7)
Equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) imply:
Pr(buy|φ)=( 1− α + αq)
1
2







Substituting (2.5) and (2.8) into (2.4) we obtain:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|buy,φ)=










Equations (2.9) and (2.10) imply that when the market maker receives a buy order he
attaches a higher probability to εt+1 = ε than to εt+1 = −ε. The intuition is that uninformed
traders’ actions are not inﬂuenced by εt+1 while informed traders are more likely to buy when
εt+1 = ε than when εt+1 = −ε.




(2q − 1)ε. (2.11)
It follows that E(εt+1|buy,φ) is zero when there is no private information, α =0or q =0 .5.












7When there is no private information, Fa
t (φ) is independent of ε because a buy order conveys
no information about future exchange rates. When there is private information, α>0 and
q>0.5, Fa
t (φ) is an increasing function of the fraction of informed traders, α,a n do fε,
which is the standard deviation of εt+1.
In the appendix we show that the full set of forward rates, Fb
t (φ), F a







St [1 + φ +( 2 q − 1)εα/(2 − α)] if φt = φ,





St [1 + φ − (2q − 1)ε] if φt = φ,
St [1 − φ − (2q − 1)εα/(2 − α)] if φt = −φ. (2.13)
3. Properties of the Model
In this section we analyze the properties of our model and deduce its implications for the
variability of bid-ask spreads, the population values of the slope coeﬃcient in the forward
premium regression, and the mean-squared errors associated with diﬀerent exchange rate
forecasts.
3.1. Bid-Ask Spreads
It is well-known that bid-ask spreads in forward markets display very low levels of volatility
(see also Section 4). A natural question is whether our model is consistent with this fact.
The following proposition establishes that it is.
Proposition 3.1. To a ﬁrst-order approximation, the bid-a s ks p r e a di nf o r w a r dm a r k e t si s











(2q − 1)ε. (3.1)
The proof of this proposition follows directly from equations (2.12) and (2.13).
According to equation (3.1) the severity of the adverse-selection problem in forward
markets is reﬂected in the level of the bid-ask spread but not in its volatility. When there
is no adverse selection (q =1 /2) the bid-ask spread collapses to zero. The bid-ask spread is
increasing in the precision of the signal received by the informed agents. The spread is also
increasing in ε, which is the standard deviation of εt+1.
83.2. The Forward Premium Regression
We now state the main result of our paper. The following proposition establishes the condi-
tions under which our model can account, in population, for the forward premium puzzle.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the regression equation:
St+1 − St
St




where ξt+1 is the regression error. Suppose that the data is generated by our model. Then
the probability limit of ˆ β, the least-squares estimator for β,i s :
plim ˆ β =
φ
φ − (1 − α)(2q − 1)ε/(2 − α)
.





(2q − 1)ε, (3.3)
then plim ˆ β<0.
Proof: See appendix.
To understand why proposition 3.2 holds regardless of how Ft is measured, note that
(2.13) implies:
Fa










so the right-hand side variable in regression (3.2) is always the same up to an additive
constant.
To provide intuition for why plim ˆ β can be negative we begin by considering two extreme
cases. In the ﬁrst case, all traders are uninformed, so market makers do not face an adverse-
selection problem. In the second case all traders are informed. In this case there is an
adverse-selection problem but its severity is not related to the value of φt. In both cases
plim ˆ β =1 .T o o b t a i n plim ˆ β<0 it is critical that there is less of an adverse-selection
problem when, based on public information, the currency is expected to appreciate (φt = φ).
All traders are uninformed (q =1 /2) In this case market makers do not face an adverse-
selection problem. Equation (2.13) implies that the bid-ask spread is zero, Fa
t (φt)=Fb
t (φt),
a n dt h ef o r w a r dp r e m i u mi s :
Fa




t (φt) − St
St
= φt. (3.4)
9Since εt+1, ωt+1,a n dφt are orthogonal, equations (2.1) and (3.4) imply that the forward rate
is equal to the expected value of the future spot exchange rate. Consequently, plim ˆ β =1 .
All traders are informed (α =1 ,q>1/2) In this case the direction of an order
completely reveals the signal received by traders, so that all agents have the same expectation
about εt+1 and St+1. Equation (2.13) implies that the forward premium is:
Fa
t (φt) − St
St
= φt +( 2 q − 1)ε,
Fb
t (φt) − St
St
= φt − (2q − 1)ε. (3.5)
The intuition underlying (3.5) is particularly transparent when q =1 . In this case all agents
except the market maker have perfect information about εt+1. W h e na na g e n tw a n t st o
buy (sell) the pounds forward the market maker can deduce that εt+1 = ε (εt+1 = −ε).
Consequently, the forward rate fully reﬂects the realized value of εt+1.S i n c eεt+1, ωt+1,a n d
φt are orthogonal, (2.1) and (3.5) imply that plim ˆ β =1regardless of whether we use Fa
t or
Fb
t in regression (3.2). This result holds in the more general case where q>1/2.
Informed and uninformed traders (α<1,q>1/2) T h ec e n t r a lf e a t u r eo ft h i sc a s ei s
that a market maker faces less adverse selection when φt = φ. To make the intuition for this
case as transparent as possible suppose that q =1 .W h e n φt = −φ only informed agents
buy the pound forward. It follows that when the market maker receives a buy order he can
infer with certainty that the buyer is informed and that εt+1 = ε.C o n s e q u e n t l y , Fa
t (−φ)
fully reﬂects the fact that εt+1 = ε:
F
a
t (−φ)=St (1 − φ + ε). (3.6)
In contrast, when φt = φ, both uninformed and informed agents buy the pound forward. It
follows that a buy order can come from either an uninformed agent responding to φt > 0 or
















10In this equation, the coeﬃcient on ε is less than one.






The ask forward rate is actually lower when, based on public information, the pound is
expected to appreciate. Consequently, the covariance between (St+1 − St)/St and [Fa
t (φt)−
St]/St is negative. It follows that plim ˆ β<0.
Condition (3.3) plays an important role in our results. This condition requires that the
predictability of exchange rate changes based on public information be relatively small. This
restriction is consistent with the large literature that documents how diﬃcult it is to predict
exchange rates.







(2q − 1)εSt. (3.9)







Aggregate trader proﬁts are zero:
απ
e
i +( 1− α)π
e
u =0 .
As is standard in models with informed and uninformed agents, informed agents make pos-
itive expected proﬁts, whereas uninformed agents make negative expected proﬁts. Suppose
that α is close to zero (there are very few informed traders) and q is close to 1/2 (private
information is very noisy). Then the expected loss of each uninformed trader is vanishingly
small.





i is positive there is always a φ such that this condition is satisﬁed. Put diﬀerently,
as long as it is diﬃcult to forecast exchange rates using public information and there are
informed traders who make positive expected proﬁts, there must be a forward premium
puzzle.
11Up to now we have assumed that uninformed agents buy (sell) the pound forward when
they expect the pound to appreciate (depreciate). What is critical for our results is that
these traders are more likely to buy pounds forward when, based on public information, the
pound is expected to appreciate. The following proposition formalizes this point.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the data are generated by a version of our model in which,
with probability v>1/2, uninformed traders sell (buy) the pound forward when φt > 0
(φt < 0).T h e nplim ˆ β in regression (3.2) is:
plim ˆ β =
φ
φ − α(z − 1)(2q − 1)ε/[z (2 − z)]
,
where z =2 v(1 − α)+α. This results holds whether Ft is measured using the ask rate, the




(2q − 1)ε. (3.10)
Then plim ˆ β<0.
Proof: See appendix.
Since the right hand side of (3.10) is increasing in v, the higher v i st h em o r el i k e l yi ti s
that condition (3.10) holds. When v =1condition (3.10) reduces to condition (3.3).
A testable implication of our model is that the magnitude of the forward premium puzzle
declines as the forward premium becomes more volatile. This property is summarized in the
following proposition:
Corollary 3.4. If condition (3.10) holds then plim ˆ β can be written as:
plim ˆ β =
−φ
Standard Deviation[(Ft − St)/St]
.
Proof: See appendix.
Suppose that we are willing to assume that the parameter φ is roughly the same across
a group of countries. Then, we can assess the prediction provided by the previous corollary
without taking a stand on the values of the model’s underlying parameters. We discuss our
results in Section 5.
123.3. Forecasting the Future Spot Exchange Rate
We now consider another prediction of our model that involves the relative performance of
two alternative forecasts of St+1/St.T h e ﬁrst forecast is based on the forward exchange
rate: E (St+1/St)=Ft/St. The second forecast assumes that St is a martingale, so that:
E(St+1/St)=1 . Since forward rates are forward looking it is natural to expect the ﬁrst
forecast to outperform the second forecast. However, as we show in the next section, the
opposite is true in our data set.
There is a close connection between the forward premium puzzle and the fact that the
spot exchange rate outperforms the forward rate in predicting the future spot rate. Deﬁne
the mean-square-forecast error of St+1/St based on the average of the bid and ask forward
exchange rates:
MSEF = E [(St+1 − Ft)/St]
2 . (3.11)
Also deﬁne the mean-square-forecast error of St+1/St based on the spot exchange rate as:
MSES = E [(St+1 − St)/St]
2 . (3.12)
It is straightforward to show that:
MSEF − MSES =v a r[ ( Ft − St)/St](1− 2β). (3.13)
Equation (3.13) implies that models embodying uncovered interest rate parity (β =1 )a r e
inconsistent with the ﬁnding that MSEF >MS E S. Since our model can generate β<0,i t
implies that MSEF >MS E S.
4. A Numerical Example
In this section We conclude by addressing three potential concerns about our explanation of
the forward premium puzzle. The ﬁrst concern is that we require volatility in bid-ask spreads
that are much higher than those observed in the data. In fact, our model generates forward
bid-ask spreads that are, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, constant. So, if anything our model
understates the volatility of bid-ask spreads. The second concern is that our model requires
very volatile forward premia. Given covered interest rate parity, this property would imply
that our model generates movements in interest rate spreads that are counterfactually high.
The third concern is that our model requires a large fraction of informed traders.
13The ability of our model to account for the forward premium puzzle would not be very
interesting if we had to assume that forward premia are much more volatile than the data.
Given covered interest rate parity, this shortcoming would translate into counterfactually
volatile interest rate movements. The plausibility of our model would also be seriously be
called into question if we had to assume that a large fraction of traders is informed. In this
section we provide a numerical example, loosely calibrated to the data, to demonstrate that
the model can generate large negative values for the plim of β in regression (3.2) with low
volatility in forward premia and a small value of α.
We begin by describing some basic properties of the data. Our data set, obtained from
Datastream, consists of daily observations on dealer quotes of bid and ask spot exchange
rates and 1-month forward exchange rates. We convert daily data into non-overlapping
monthly observations.10 Our sample period is January 1976 to December 1998 for the Euro-
legacy currencies and January 1976 to December 2005 for all other currencies. The countries
included in our data set are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. All exchange rates are quoted in units of foreign
currency per British pound.
Table 1 summarizes some basic properties of the data. Column 1 reports the time series
median bid-ask spread on one-month forward contracts against the pound. The numbers
range from a high of 0.34 percent for the Dutch guilder to a low of 0.07 percent for the U.S.
dollar. The average bid-ask spread across currencies is about 0.23 percent. Column 2 reports
the standard deviation of the bid-ask spread for each of the nine currencies. From this column
we see that the bid-ask spread volatility is quite low. The average, across currencies, of the
standard deviation of the bid-ask spread is roughly 0.13 percent. Columns 3 and 4 report
the standard deviations of the monthly rate of depreciation, δt+1 =( St+1 − St)/St,a n dt h e
forward premium, ft =( Ft − St)/St,w h e r eSt and Ft a r em e a s u r e da st h ea v e r a g eo fb i d
and ask rates. We denote by σδ and σf the standard deviation of δt+1 and ft, respectively.
The average values of σδ and σf are 2.9 percent and 0.26 percent, respectively. Column 5
reports the ratio of these standard deviations. The average ratio of the two volatilities is
roughly 12, indicating that changes in exchange rates are extraordinarily volatile relative to
the forward premium. Column 6 reports our estimates of β,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient in regression
(3.2). Consistent with the literature, our estimates of β are negative for each of the nine
10See the appendix in Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) for details.
14countries in our sample. The average point estimate of β across countries is −1.75. Finally,
column 7 reports the ratio of the sample analogues to MSEF and MSES deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 1 )
and (3.12). Consistent with equation (3.13), this ratio is always above one, with an average
value of 1.032.
In our numerical example we set the percentage of informed traders to a small number,
α =0 .0001. For simplicity we assume that v =1 , so that uninformed agents always buy
(sell) the pound forward when φt > 0 (φt < 0). We then choose values of σω, φ,a n dε so as
to match, with the lowest possible value of q, the average monthly value of σδ (0.029), the
average estimate of β (−1.75), and the average monthly bid-ask spread in forward markets
(0.0023). The resulting value of q is 0.54. The corresponding values of σω, φ,a n dε are
0.0037, 0.00073,a n d0.0287, respectively. Clearly, it is possible to account for the forward
premium puzzle without assuming that there is a large fraction of informed traders who
receive very precise signals about future spot exchange rates.
In our calibration the process εt+1, about which informed traders receive signals, generates
most of the volatility in the exchange rate. However, the quality of private information about
εt+1 is relatively low, as q is close to 1/2. Alternatively, we can match the same set of moments
in the data (σδ, ˆ β, and the average bid-ask spread) by assuming that ωt+1 generates most
of the volatility in the exchange rate, as long as we also assume a larger value of q.I nt h i s
case, private information about εt+1 is of higher quality, but this information is less useful
in forecasting St+1. In both cases, informed traders have only a limited ability to forecast
St+1.
We now turn to the model’s implication for the volatility of interest rate spreads. The
average monthly volatility of the forward premia is 0.04 percent in our model and on average
0.26 percent across the nine countries in our sample (see Table 1). Given covered interest
parity this result implies that interest rate spreads are much more volatile in our model than
in the data. So the adverse selection mechanism in our model can generate the forward
premium puzzle, while adding very little volatility to interest rates.
5. Is There Always a Forward Premium Puzzle?
A c c o r d i n gt oo u rm o d e lplim ˆ β<0 only when condition (3.10) is satisﬁed. As φ gets
very large most of the variation in exchange rates can be predicted on the basis of public
information and plim ˆ β converges to one. This property is desirable because the forward
15premium puzzle is not uniformly present in the data. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show
that, in a cross section of countries, estimates of β are positively related to the average
rate of inﬂation. Suppose that the predictability of the spot exchange rate based on public
information is higher in high inﬂation countries. Then, our model is consistent with the
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ﬁndings. Figure 1 provides complementary evidence to Bansal
and Dahlquist (2000). The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 displays the cross-sectional relation between
the average monthly inﬂation rate in the period 1976—1998 and estimates of ˆ β for a group
of 15 countries. The average annual rate of inﬂation across the countries included in Table
1 is equal to 4.6 percent. The larger data set being used here includes Denmark, Ireland,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, countries whose average annual rate of inﬂation was
8.2 percent between 1976 and 1998. Not surprisingly, there is a positive cross-sectional
relation between the average rate of inﬂation and the average rate of depreciation over this
sample period (see the second panel of Figure 1).
We conclude by showing that the data are consistent with the prediction associated with
the corollary to proposition 3.3. According to this corollary, plim ˆ β becomes a larger negative
number when the volatility of the forward premium decreases. We assess this prediction using
the cross-country relation between the magnitude of ˆ β and the estimated volatility of the
forward premium. Both columns 3 and 5 of Table 1 and Figure 2 show a tight connection
between the magnitude of ˆ β and the volatility of the forward premium in the direction
predicted by our model.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we present a model in which adverse-selection problems between market mak-
ers and traders rationalizes a negative covariance between the forward premium and changes
in exchange rates. The key feature of our model is that the adverse-selection problem fac-
ing market makers is worse when, based on public information, a currency is expected to
appreciate.
Macroeconomists generally assume that asset markets are Walrasian in nature. This
assumption is questionable on empirical grounds. Other assets, such as treasury bills are
traded in over-the-counter markets in which market makers and traders interact (see e.g.
Fleming (1997) and Massa and Simonov (2003)). Our results suggest that adverse selection
problems in these markets are a promising avenue of research for understanding asset pricing
16puzzles that have been diﬃcult to resolve purely on the basis of risk considerations.
We conclude by noting an important questi o nt h a tw ed on o ta d d r e s si nt h i sp a p e r :a t
what horizon does private information matter for exchange rates? Albuquerque, de Fran-
cisco, and Marques (2007) provide empirical evidence on the answer to this question. These
authors argue that private information has signiﬁcant eﬀects on various asset returns, in-
cluding exchange rates, at least at a monthly frequency. Further work on this issue would
be extremely useful for assessing the plausibility of our proposed resolution of the forward
premium puzzle.
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18A. Appendix
We work with the most general model presented in the main text. In this version we assume
that, with probability v>1/2, uninformed traders sell (buy) the pound forward when φt > 0
(φt < 0).
A.1. Computing Forward Exchange Rates
The Ask Rate when the Public Signal is Positive When φt = φ, v of the uninformed
traders buy the pound forward, and if εt+1 = ε, then with probability q informed traders
buy the pound forward, so
Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,φ)=( 1− α)v + αq.( A . 1 )
If εt+1 = −ε, then, with probability 1 − q informed traders buy the pound forward, so
Pr(buy|εt+1 = −ε,φ)=( 1− α)v + α(1 − q).( A . 2 )
Hence,
Pr(buy|φ)=( 1− α)v +
α
2
.( A . 3 )
Substituting (A.1) and (A.3) into (2.4) we obtain:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|buy,φ)=
(1 − α)v + αq
2v(1 − α)+α
.( A . 4 )
Pr(εt+1 = −ε|buy,φ)=
(1 − α)v + α − αq
2v(1 − α)+α
.( A . 5 )















.( A . 6 )
When ν =1this expression reduces to the one found in equation (2.13).
19The Ask Rate when the Public Signal is Negative Fa
t (−φ) is equal to the market
maker’s expectation of St+1 conditional on having received a buy order and on φt = −φ:
F
a
t (−φ)=E(St+1|buy,−φ)=St [1 − φ + E(εt+1|buy,−φ)].( A . 7 )
Now
E(εt+1|buy,−φ)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|buy,−φ)ε +P r ( εt+1 = −ε|buy,−φ)(−ε).( A . 8 )
To calculate the probabilities on the right-hand-side of (A.8):
Pr(εt+1 = ε|buy,−φ)=
Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,−φ)Pr(εt+1 = ε)
Pr(buy| − φ)
.( A . 9 )
When φt = −φ, 1 − v of the uninformed traders buy the pound forward, and if εt+1 = ε,
then with probability q informed traders buy the pound forward, so
Pr(buy|εt+1 = ε,−φ)=( 1− α)(1− v)+αq.( A . 1 0 )
If εt+1 = −ε, then with probability 1 − q, informed traders buy the pound forward, so
Pr(buy|εt+1 = −ε,−φ)=( 1− α)(1− v)+α(1 − q).( A . 1 1 )
Hence,
Pr(buy| − φ)=( 1− α)(1− v)+
α
2
.( A . 1 2 )
Substituting (A.10) and (A.12) into (A.9) we obtain:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|buy,−φ)=
(1 − α)(1− v)+αq
2(1− α)(1− v)+α
.( A . 1 3 )
Pr(εt+1 = −ε|buy,−φ)=
(1 − α)(1− v)+α(1 − q)
2(1− α)(1− v)+α
.( A . 1 4 )















.( A . 1 5 )
20The Bid Rate when the Public Signal is Positive Fb
t (φ) is equal to the market
maker’s expectation of St+1 conditional on having received a sell order and on φt = φ:
F
b
t (φ)=E(St+1|sell,φ)=St [1 + φ + E(εt+1|sell,φ)].( A . 1 6 )
Now
E(εt+1|sell,φ)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|sell,φ)ε +P r ( εt+1 = −ε|sell,φ)(−ε).( A . 1 7 )
T oc a l c u l a t et h i sw en e e d
Pr(εt+1 = ε|sell,φ)=
Pr(sell|εt+1 = ε,φ)Pr(εt+1 = ε)
Pr(sell|φ)
.( A . 1 8 )
Since agents either buy or sell, we can use our calculations above, i.e. (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3)
to get the probabilities:
Pr(sell|εt+1 = ε,φ)=1− (1 − α)v − αq,( A . 1 9 )
Pr(sell|εt+1 = −ε,φ)=1− (1 − α)v − α(1 − q),( A . 2 0 )
Pr(sell|φ)=1− (1 − α)v −
α
2
.( A . 2 1 )
Substituting (A.19) and (A.21) into (A.18) we obtain:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|sell,φ)=
1 − (1 − α)v − αq
2 − 2(1− α)v − α
,( A . 2 2 )
and
Pr(εt+1 = −ε|sell,φ)=
1 − α − (1 − α)v + αq
2 − 2(1− α)v − α
.( A . 2 3 )
Using (A.22), (A.23), and (A.17) we obtain:
E(εt+1|sell,φ)=−
α









2 − 2(1− α)v − α
(2q − 1)ε
¸
.( A . 2 4 )
21The Bid Rate when the Public Signal is Negative Fb
t (−φ) is equal to the market
maker’s expectation of St+1 conditional on having received a sell order and on φt = −φ:
F
b
t (−φ)=E(St+1|sell,−φ)=St [1 − φ + E(εt+1|sell,−φ)].( A . 2 5 )
Now
E(εt+1|sell,−φ)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|sell,−φ)ε +P r ( εt+1 = −ε|sell,−φ)(−ε).( A . 2 6 )
T oc a l c u l a t et h i sw en e e d :
Pr(εt+1 = ε|sell,−φ)=
Pr(sell|εt+1 = ε,−φ)Pr(εt+1 = ε)
Pr(sell| − φ)
.( A . 2 7 )
Since agents either buy or sell, we can use our calculations above, i.e. (A.10), (A.11), and
(A.12) to get the probabilities:
Pr(sell|εt+1 = ε,−φ)=v + α − qα− vα,( A . 2 8 )
Pr(sell|εt+1 = −ε,−φ)=v + qα− vα,( A . 2 9 )
Pr(sell| − φ)=v +
1
2
α − vα.( A . 3 0 )
Substituting (A.28) and (A.30) into (A.27) we obtain:
Pr(εt+1 = ε|sell,−φ)=
v + α − qα− vα
2v + α − 2vα
,( A . 3 1 )
Pr(εt+1 = −ε|sell,−φ)=
v + qα− vα
2v + α − 2vα
.( A . 3 2 )
Using (A.31), (A.32), and (A.26) we obtain:
E(εt+1|sell,−φ)=−
α







1 − φ −
α
2v − (2v − 1)α
(2q − 1)ε
¸
.( A . 3 3 )





St [1 + φ +( 2 q − 1)εα/z] if φt = φ,





St [1 + φ − (2q − 1)εα/(2 − z)] if φt = φ,
St [1 − φ − (2q − 1)εα/z] if φt = −φ. (A.34)
where z =2 v(1 − α)+α. In the main text we consider the case where v =1 , in which case
z =2− α and the forward exchange rates are given by (2.13).
22A.2. Is the Behavior of the Informed Optimal?
We now verify that it is optimal for an informed agent to buy the pound forward when he
receives a signal ζt = ε. Given the signal, his expectation of St+1 is:
E (St+1|ζt = ε)=St [1 + φt + E (εt+1|ζt = ε)].
Since
E(εt+1|ζt = ε)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|ζt = ε)ε +P r ( εt+1 = −ε|ζt = ε)(−ε),
= qε+( 1− q)(−ε)=( 2 q − 1)ε.
we have
E (St+1|ζt = ε)=St [1 + φt +( 2 q − 1)ε].
The expected payoﬀ associated with buying the pound forward is:
π
e
i = E (St+1|ζt = ε) − F
a
t (φt).
Hence when φt = φ the agent’s expected proﬁti s :
π
e
i = St [1 + φ +( 2 q − 1)ε] − St [1 + φ +( 2 q − 1)εα/z],
=( 1 − α/z)(2q − 1)εSt.
When φt = −φ the agent’s expected proﬁti s :
π
e
i = St [1 − φ +( 2 q − 1)ε] − St [1 − φ +( 2 q − 1)εα/(2 − z)],
=[ 1 − α/(2 − z)](2q − 1)εSt.
Since z =2 v(1 − α)+α, it follows that α<zand that α ≤ 2−z (with equality only in the
case where v =1 ). Thus πe
i > 0 when φt = φ and πe
i ≥ 0 when φt = −φ (with equality only
if v =1 ) .H e n c ei ti so p t i m a lf o ra g e n t st ob u yt h ep o u n df o r w a r dw h e nζt = ε.
We also verify that it is optimal for an informed agent to sell the pound forward when
he receives a signal ζt = −ε. Given the signal his expectation of St+1 is:
E (St+1|ζt = −ε)=St [1 + φt + E (εt+1|ζt = −ε)].
Since
E(εt+1|ζt = −ε)=P r ( εt+1 = ε|ζt = −ε)ε +P r ( εt+1 = −ε|ζt = −ε)(−ε),
=( 1 − q)ε + q(−ε)=−(2q − 1)ε,
23we have
E (St+1|ζt = −ε)=St [1 + φt − (2q − 1)ε].





t (φt) − E (St+1|ζt = −ε).
Hence when φt = φ the agent’s expected proﬁti s :
π
e
i = St [1 + φ − (2q − 1)εα/(2 − z)] − St [1 + φ − (2q − 1)ε],
=[ 1 − α/(2 − z)](2q − 1)εSt.
When φt = −φ the agent’s expected proﬁti s :
π
e
i = St [1 − φ − (2q − 1)εα/z] − St [1 − φ − (2q − 1)ε],
=( 1 − α/z)(2q − 1)εSt.
Using the same argument as above, πe
i ≥ 0 when φt = φ (with equality only if v =1 )a n d
πe
i > 0 when φt = −φ. Hence it is optimal for agents to sell the pound forward when ζt = −ε.
A.3. Proof of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
Let δt+1 =( St+1 − St)/St and ft =( Ft − St)/St. Consider a regression:
δt+1 = a + βft + ξt+1.( A . 3 5 )
In our model
δt+1 = φt + εt+1 + ωt+1.
It follows from (A.34) that the mid-point forward exchange rate is:
Ft(φt)=
½
St (1 + φ − θε) if φt = φ,





(2q − 1) > 0.





φ +( 2 q − 1)εα/z if φt = φ,





φ − (2q − 1)εα/(2 − z) if φt = φ,
−φ − (2q − 1)εα/z if φt = −φ.
24A little algebra shows that these expressions can be rewritten as fa
t = ft+d and fb






This equation establishes that the regression slope coeﬃc i e n tw i l lb et h es a m ef o ra n yv e r s i o n
of the forward price. Only the regression intercept will be diﬀerent.
The slope coeﬃcient in the regression (A.35) has the following property:




Since the forward premium depends only on the value of φt, and does not depend on the









2 =( φ − θε)







(−φ)(−φ + θε)=φ(φ − θε).
Hence
plim ˆ β =
φ
φ − θε
.( A . 3 7 )
So if φ<θ ε ,t h e nplim ˆ β<0. This condition is the same as condition (3.10) in proposition
3.3. When v =1then z =2− α and θ =( 2 q − 1)(1 − α)/(2 − α) so we obtain condition
(3.3) in proposition 3.2.
The corollary to proposition 3.3 follows immediately from equations (A.36) and (A.37).






(1 − α/z)(2q − 1)εSt +
1
2
[1 − α/(2 − z)](2q − 1)εSt,
= {1 − α/[z(2 − z)]}(2q − 1)εSt.
When v =1 , πe
i =[ ( 2 q − 1)(1 − α)/(2 − α)]εSt = θεSt. Thus, if the model is parameterized
such that θε is large, informed traders will make large expected proﬁts and there will be a
forward premium puzzle. Notice that θε is increasing in q (the quality of the informed agent’s
information about ε)a n dε (the importance of that information in forecasting exchange rates)
and is decreasing in α (the number of informed agents).11
11In the more complicated case where 1/2 <v<1 it remains true that θε and an informed trader’s proﬁts
are both increasing in q and ε, and are both decreasing in α,s oc h o i c e so fq, ε,a n dα that are consistent
with large proﬁts for the informed trader are more likely to be consistent with the forward premium puzzle.
25A.4. Mean-Squared Error of Forecasting Rules
G i v e nt h er e s u l t ,s t a t e da b o v e ,t h a tft = φt−sign(φt)θε and given that δt+1 = φt+εt+1+ωt+1,
it follows that:
MSEF = E(δt+1 − ft)
2 = E [εt+1 + ωt+1 + sign(φt)θε]
2 ,













This means that the current spot rate is a better predictor of the future spot rate if φ<θ ε .
This is the same condition that determines when β<0 in the model. However, there is a
simpler way to verify that the spot is the better predictor when β<0. By construction:




=v a r ( ft) − 2cov(δt+1,f t),
=v a r ( ft)(1 − 2β).
Hence, the spot rate is the better predictor whenever β<1/2.
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Note:T h ex- a x i si st h ea v e r a g eC P Ii n ﬂation rate during the period 1976—1998. The
y-axis in the top panel is the forward premium regression coeﬃcient, ˆ β.T h ey-axis in the
bottom panel is the average annual rate of depreciation against the British pound computed
o v e rt h es a m ep e r i o d .T h ec o u n t r i e si nt h es a m p l ea r et h o s eu s e di nT a b l e1p l u sA u s t r i a ,
Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
27FIGURE 2
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Note:T h e x-axis is the standard deviation of the forward premium, measured using
average of bid and ask prices, for each of the countries indicated during the period 1976—
2005, except for the Euro legacy currencies (for which the sample period ends December
1998) and Japan (for which the sample begins July 1978). The y- a x i si st h ef o r w a r dp r e m i u m
regression coeﬃcient, ˆ β, computed over the same period. The countries in the sample are
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the

















†  0.25 0.11 0.027 0.0030 9.1 -1.53 1.049
Canada 0.10 0.05 0.032 0.0019 16.5 -3.49 1.029
France
†  0.15 0.07 0.027 0.0036 7.5 -0.47 1.035
Germany
†  0.31 0.15 0.028 0.0026 10.6 -0.73 1.022
Italy
†  0.17 0.17 0.027 0.0040 6.8 -0.66 1.051
Japan* 0.27 0.19 0.035 0.0016 22.1 -3.82 1.018
Netherlands
†  0.34 0.13 0.027 0.0021 12.8 -2.19 1.033
Switzerland 0.41 0.19 0.029 0.0026 11.0 -1.21 1.028
USA 0.07 0.07 0.031 0.0024 12.9 -1.68 1.026
Average 0.23 0.13 0.029 0.0026 12.1 -1.75 1.032
* Data for Japan begin 7/78
† Data for Euro legacy currencies ends 12/98
Sources: Datastream; see Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2006) for details.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of the Data, 1976-2005
Standard deviations